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Abstract. Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) are increasingly em-
ployed in tactical military and civil rapid-deployment networks, including
emergency rescue operations and ad hoc disaster-relief networks. How-
ever, this flexibility of MANETs comes at a price, when compared to
wired and base station-based wireless networks: MANETs are suscepti-
ble to both insider and outsider attacks. This is mainly because of the
lack of a well-defined defense perimeter preventing the effective use of
wired defenses including firewalls and intrusion detection systems.
We introduce a novel distributed security policy enforcement architecture
that is designed specifically for MANETs. Our approach harnesses and
extends the concept of network capabilities and is especially suited for
mobile and heterogeneous communication environments. Our model im-
poses communication restrictions between MANET nodes by enforcing
hop-by-hop policies in a distributed manner. We use a deny-by-default
principle, allowing compromised nodes to access only authorized services.
This significantly limits their ability disrupt or even interfere with end-
to-end connectivity and nodes beyond their local communication radius.
In this short paper, we only present the overall architecture of the system.
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1 Introduction
Recent advances in low-power computing and communications have led to the
proliferation of handheld and portable devices equipped with wireless connectiv-
ity. These mobile wireless devices appear to be ideal for situations where fixed
infrastructure is too costly or dangerous to deploy, or has been rendered inop-
erable. However, because of radio power consumption, physical obstacles, and
channel capacity, a mobile node may not be able to reach all other nodes within
a single broadcast. Therefore, to achieve end-to-end connectivity, nodes have
to form mobile ad hoc wireless networks (MANETs), which allow data to be
routed through intermediate nodes. MANETs are fundamentally different from
the Internet because all peers act as both sources and routers using the other
participants to relay packets to their final destination. Due to their flexibility,
MANETs are currently employed in both military and commercial applications.
Unfortunately, not all MANET nodes are equally capable, nor can all users
be equally trusted. Worse yet, mobile nodes in tactical environments run the
danger of being captured or malfunction. Even a small number of misbehaving
nodes can successfully render the entire MANET inoperable: malicious peers can
abuse the network exhausting all network and power resources.
In traditional networks, malicious nodes and traffic are kept away from a set
of nodes belonging to an organization or a group using firewalls. This is feasible
because of the existence of a well defined network perimeter. All incoming and
outgoing traffic needs to transit through these firewall nodes, which enforce the
policies at the perimeter. Within the perimeter, smaller sub-groups can have
more stringent policies by deploying their own firewalls. Unfortunately, the con-
cept of a network perimeter does not exist in MANETs, and policies need to be
enforced in a distributed manner while taking into consideration node mobility.
To address this, we propose an architecture that enforces trust relationships
and traffic accountability between mobile nodes through a novel policy enforce-
ment scheme designed specifically for MANETs. We extend the network ca-
pability framework [8, 2] and we tailor it to the resource-constrained MANET
environment. A capability is a token of authority that has associated rights. In
our model, capabilities propagate both access control rules and traffic-shaping
parameters that should govern a node’s traffic. To that end, we define a pro-
tocol for communicating capabilities, which are treated as soft state, across the
MANET.
Our architecture enables the enforcement of adaptive bandwidth constraints
inside the network, denying by default unauthorized traffic. Nodes can only
access the services and hosts they are authorized for by the capabilities given
to them. Compromised or malicious nodes cannot exceed their authority and
expose the whole network to an adversary. Upon detection, we can prevent a
compromised node from further attacking the network simply by revoking its
capabilities. Moreover, our architecture helps mitigate the impact of denial of
service (DoS) attacks because excess or unauthorized packets are dropped closer
to the attack source. Thus, we avoid unnecessary data processing and forwarding
at the target node and the network itself.
Even though we focus on MANETs, our system can also be used in wired net-
works. However, MANETs provide our architecture both advantages and chal-
lenges. Specifically, the ratio of CPU cycles to available bandwidths (Hz/kbit) is
normally higher in MANET nodes compared to their wired counterparts. This
enables us to do more intelligent processing (and use cryptography) on most
or all of the packets transiting through a MANET node. The number of traffic
flows handled by a MANET node is also small due to the small network size.
However, frequent route changes between a source and a destination node due
to node mobility represents a difficult challenge in an distributed enforcement
environment such as ours.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by describing the
threat model in Section 2. We then present the system architecture and a high-
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level overview of our scheme, including the security analysis, in Section 3. Related
work is discussed in Section 4.
2 Threat Model
Our goal is to protect network resources and end-node services from denial of
service attacks, and to enforce access control rules in the absence of a fixed
topology. Thus, we want a node to be able to access only the services it is entitled
to, and to limit the amount of traffic that can be sent to any such service. To
preserve bandwidth and power, we need to filter any unauthorized traffic early
on.
We assume MANET environments where an adversary may be an existing
node that has been compromised (insider) or a malicious external node that
might want to participate in the MANET. In addition, there may be multiple
cooperating adversaries; and compromised nodes may not be detected as such
immediately, or ever (depending on their actions).
The resources needed to access a service are allocated by the group con-
troller(s) (GCs) of the MANET. Group controllers are nodes responsible for
maintaining the group membership for a set of MANET nodes, and a priori
authorize communications within the group. This means that GCs do not par-
ticipate in the actual communications, nor do they need to be consulted by nodes
in real time; in fact, if they distribute the appropriate policies ahead of time,
they need not even be members of the MANET. In most cases, the GC may
be reachable through a high-energy-consumption, high-latency, low-bandwidth
long-range link (e.g., a satellite connection); interactions in such an environment
should be kept to a minimum, and only for exceptional circumstances (e.g., for
revoking access for compromised nodes).
Without compromising a GC, an external node can participate in a MANET
only by stealing the authorization credentials that are bound to the identity of a
legitimate node. Because we envision GCs as being primarily oﬄine or, at best,
intermittently reachable (with respect to the MANET), we are not addressing
the issue of compromised controllers in this paper.
If a node is compromised, an adversary can only access the services and
bandwidth that node is authorized to access. If other MANET nodes are adhering
to our architecture, a compromised node does not have the ability to disrupt or
interfere with end-to-end service connectivity and other nodes beyond its local
radio communication radius. The nodes providing services will receive only the
traffic that the compromised node is authorized to transmit, unless the adversary
is in the local communication radius.
3 System Architecture
In our architecture, there is one or more pre-defined nodes that act as a group
controller (GC). These nodes are trusted by all the group nodes. For simplicity
and without loss of generality, we will assume that all the MANET nodes are
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part of a single group. A group controller has authority to assign resources to
the nodes in MANET. These resources are expressed in terms of limits on the
number of packets or on bandwidth rates that a MANET participant is permitted
to transmit toward another node. The resource allocation by the GC to a node
is represented using a credential called policy token that all the nodes can verify.
The policy tokens are typically provisioned ahead of time, and represent the
projections of centralized policy, even though an on-demand allocation from the
GC is possible. The GC may be oﬄine after it distributes the policy tokens,
and may be reachable sporadically at best after that (as external connectivity
permits). The presence of the GC is not required, after the initial policy token
distribution, for the normal working of the protocol.
When a node (initiator) requests a service from another MANET node (re-
sponder) using the policy token assigned to the initiator, the responder can
provide a capability back to the initiator. This is called a network capability,
and it is generated based on the resource policy assigned to the responder and
its dynamic conditions (e.g., level of utilization).
All the nodes in the path from an initiator to a responder (i.e., nodes re-
laying the packets) are required to enforce and abide by the resource allocation
encoded by the GC in the policy token and the responder in the network capa-
bility. The enforcement involves both accessibility and bandwidth allocation. A
responder accepts packets (except for the first one) from an initiator only if the
initiator has authorization to send, in the form of a valid network capability. An
intermediate node will forward the packets from a node only if the packets have
an associated policy token and network capability, and if they do not violate the
conditions contained therein. Note that the possession of a network capability
does not imply resource reservation; they are the maximum limit a node can use.
Available resources are allocated by the intermediate nodes in a fair manner, in
proportion to the allocations defined in the policy token and network capability.
Intermediate nodes cache policy tokens and network capabilities in a capability
database, treating them soft state.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the protocol exchanges when an initiator wants
to communicate with a responder. The initiator has a policy token previously
issued by the GC that authorizes the communication with the responder (step
1). The initiator sends a communication request (and, optionally, initial data),
along with its policy token toward the responder (step 2). This packet also con-
tains a transaction id that the initiator will use in subsequent packets to the
same responder. The packet may also contain a network capability that the ini-
tiator generates; this can be used by the responder to communicate back to
the initiator. Here, we assume that the initiator has a routing table entry for
the responder. Otherwise the underlying routing protocol will be invoked to get
the route. An intermediate node will forward the packet only after validating
it (step 3). The validation involves cryptographic verification of the capability,
and verification of the constraints (e.g., bandwidth usage, service and destina-
tion address) specified in the policy token. If the validation is successful, the
intermediate node also records the policy token in its capability database, along
4
Fig. 1. System overview
with other attributes of the packet, such as source and destination node address
and the transaction id.
The responder, on receiving the packet verifies the policy token and creates
a network capability for the initiator (step 4). The responder sends the response
to the request as well as the newly created network capability for the initiator
(step 5). The responder also creates a transaction id for the communication,
and includes it in the response. The responder also needs to include the network
capability it received from the initiator in the first message, which authorizes it
to communicate back; alternatively (or in addition), it may use a policy token
issued by the GC to responder that is authorizing the communication with the
initiator. Intermediate nodes, on receiving this packet from the responder, vali-
date the packet and adds the responder’s policy token and network capability to
its capability database (step 6). In the diagram, the reverse path is shown to be
different from the forward path; the paths can also be the same. The initiator
will then have to include the responder-issued network capability in subsequent
packets it transmits (step 7); intermediate nodes will add this credential to their
capability database (steps 8, 9).
Any further data traffic between the initiator and the responder does not
contain the policy token and network capability; instead, it contains only the
transaction id that was included in the initial handshake (steps 10-12). The
packets are signed by the sender, and can be verified by the intermediate nodes.
If the cost of the cryptographic operations is too high (in terms of latency or
power consumption), cryptographic validation may be done probabilistically.
The intermediate nodes can validate the packets by looking at the policy token
and network capability contained in the capability database corresponding to
the transaction id in the packet. This process ensures that the packet does not
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exceed the resource limit allowed in the policy token and the network capability,
and is authorized to reach the destination by both the GC and the destination
itself. For this validation, the intermediate node also maintains the resource usage
against each capability in its capability database. The only time the initiator or
responder need to re-send the capability is when the path between them changes
due to node mobility, or when the network capability expires and is reissued by
the peer.
We note that our solution can be used to protect multicast traffic and rout-
ing control packets. Furthermore, we can bound the probability of an adversary
injecting traffic that remains undetected, when probabilistic cryptographic vali-
dation is performed. We omit the details due to lack of space.
3.1 Feasibility
We argue that the proposed solution is feasible for MANETs, even though the
memory and processing power are lower in MANET nodes compared to routers in
wired networks. Our scheme requires memory to store the information about the
traffic sessions, and CPU cycles for the cryptographic operations. The feasibility
comes from the fact that the bandwidth in MANETs is significantly lower than
that of wired networks, while the nodes are relatively powerful (e.g., normal
laptops, or high-end cellphone devices). As a result, the available memory and
processing power per packet is higher in MANETs than in wired networks. The
processing power per packet for MANET nodes are increasing everyday with the
advent of faster but less power-hungry processors for portable devices.
Furthermore, the per-packet cryptographic operations, which involve a public
key signature verification, can be achieved with very small key sizes. This is
because, unlike traditional uses of public keys, these keys are useful only for the
short duration of the session. For longer sessions, new keys can be generated and
old ones discarded.
3.2 Capability definition
Each node has authority to send traffic to its peers at certain rates. This au-
thority is encoded in the policy token and network capability. Both of these are
represented by KeyNote-style credentials [3]. Each credential contains
1. Identity of the node (principal)
2. (Optional) Identity of the destination node; if left unspecified, it applies to
all destinations
3. Type of service and amount of data the principal is allowed to send
4. An expiration time
5. Signature of the GC (for policy tokens) or peer (for network capabilities)
All nodes in the MANET know the public key of the GCs, so that they can
verify policy tokens issued by them. Identities are expressed in term of the long-
term public key of the node to which a credential is assigned. The destination
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node can be a host, subnet, or public key. Type of service refers to the transport
protocol identifiers (e.g., TCP ports) a credential authorizes.
Typically, the bandwidth available to a node on a network capability is higher
than that of its policy token. Policy tokens are assigned by the GC, which has no
knowledge of network load at the time the communication takes place. Hence,
the central authority will consider the worst case scenario while assigning the
policy token and permit only enough communication to take place for a hand-
shake to occur. It is up to the responder to provide a network capability with
enough bandwidth allocation to enable the communication to proceed. Note,
also, that it is in the interest of a node to issue short-lived network capabilities
to its communicating peers, so that it can quickly respond to changing network
dynamics or (more importantly) to peer misbehavior (e.g., a flood-based DoS).
Policy tokens and network capabilities have the same syntactic representa-
tion. Following is an example:
serial: 130745







The above represents a policy token assigned by node captain.nj.army.mil to
unit01. The unit can use this policy token to send the traffic to any node in
the domain nj.army.mil. The peak data rate using this credential cannot exceed
50kbps.
If unit01 wants to communicate with unit02, it will send a message to unit02
using this policy token. Unit02 will issue a network capability for unit01, if the
communication needs more bandwidth than available in the policy token.
serial: 1567





comment: Policy allowing the receiver
to issue this capability.
signature: sig-rsa 238769789789898
This capability is restricted to be used only by unit01 for communication with
unit02. It specifies a higher bandwidth, but a shorter expiration date. The issuer
of the capability is the same as the destination of the capability.
After receiving this capability, unit01 will use this capability for communi-
cation with unit02. The more general policy token can be used by unit01 for
communicating with other nodes.
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If the communication from unit01 to unit02 was short and required low band-
width, unit01 could have used its policy token for the entire duration of the
communication, without requesting for a network capability from unit02. This
will be faster for short communication as there is no capability request/reply,
and unit02 does not have to issue any capabilities. If unit01 expects some mes-
sages from unit 2 that require more capabilities than the one that is available to
unit02 in the form of its corresponding policy token, then unit01 could issue a
network capability to unit02.
3.3 Security Analysis
We now discuss how our architecture relates to the threat model described in
Section 2.
Since the capabilities are signed by a GC and are verifiable by all nodes,
adversaries cannot generate their own valid capabilities. Adversaries can create
valid capabilities only if the GC is compromised. Since the individual packets
are signed, an adversary cannot use a transaction id that does not belong to it
to transmit packets.
A compromised or malicious node that does not enforce the capability pro-
tocol can only have impact within its communication radius. Packets generated
without the capability or with a snooped transaction id by a malicious node will
be dropped by the neighboring nodes due to invalid signatures. A compromised
node can only access the services it is authorized to. Packets of nodes trying to
use more bandwidth than is allocated to them will be rejected. A malicious node
frequently doing this can be detected and isolated.
A receiver can protect against DoS attacks by controlling the issuance of
network capabilities to its peers. A malicious node can use its policy tokens or
network capabilities to send duplicate packets in multiple disjoint paths; we do
not currently protect against this attack, which allows a node to transmit more
traffic that it is authorized to. We note, however, that local nodes in the radio
perimeter of the misbehaving node can detect this scenario. Since the network
capability can be created only based on the policy allowed by the GC, it is not
possible for two compromised nodes to collaborate and create arbitrarily large
network capabilities.
4 Related Work
Security for mobile ad hoc network is an active area of research. Most of the prior
work on MANET security focused on solving specific problems or retrofitting se-
curity into an existing IP-based network architecture; we are trying to introduce
a new architecture where security is built into the network. Surveys of research
in MANETs can be found elsewhere [11, 13, 9].
The concept of capabilities was used in operating system for securing re-
sources [10]. There was work on allowing controlled exposure of resources at the
network layer using the concept of “visas” for packets [4], which is similar to
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network capabilities. More recently, network capabilities were proposed to pre-
vent DoS in wired networks [2]. We extend the concept to MANET and use it
for both access control rules and traffic shaping parameters. In the original ap-
proach, the capabilities were assigned only by the receivers, and there is no limit
on the amount of capability that a receiver can assign. Though it achieves the
goal of preventing the DoS attack at the receiver, it does not prevent two nodes
from taking up all the available network resources. Their solution also assumes
that the links in the path between a sender and receiver cannot be snooped,
and the path is fixed. These assumptions are valid for the wire line system that
their solution is designed for, but does not work for MANETs. Previous work
on distributed firewalls [5] focused on wired fixed-network environments, and
attempts to protect only the end hosts using a host-based solution. Our solution
is for a mobile network, using a combination of network and host-based solutions
that attempt to protect both the network and end-host resources.
Signing and verification of packets between a sender and a receiver were
commercially available in early 1990s. Novell’s Netware 3.11 and 4.x supported
NCP Packet Signature Option, where a unique signature was appended to each
packet sent between the client and the server [7]. The keys for the signatures
were negotiated at login time. Intermediate nodes were not involved in packet
verification.
Mitigating the denial of service attacks by including a message authentica-
tion code and the certificate of the sender for each packet has been previously
proposed [12]. That work does not study the high overhead associated with send-
ing a large signature or a large certificate on each packet. The authors use game
theory to study the problem of dealing with selfish nodes that do not verify the
packet signatures, using incentives and punishments. This mechanism or any
other reputation based mechanism [6] can also be used in our scheme to deal
with selfish nodes.
HEAP [1] mitigates various MANET attacks from outsider nodes by doing a
hop-by-hop packet authentication using HMAC. MACs (end-to-end or hop-by-
hop) cannot deal with insider attacks. They also cannot provide access control
unless different MAC keys are used for different policies. Even with different
keys, MACs allow rogue nodes to “hide” since MACs are repudiable as all the
intermediate nodes in the path between a sender and a receiver need to know
the key. Only asymmetric key mechanisms can allow validation by all the inter-
mediate nodes that the packets indeed sent by the source node of the packet.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We presented a novel architecture for enforcing security policies in MANETs.
Our scheme, based on the concept of network capabilities and following a deny-
by-default paradigm, can protect both end-host resources and network band-
width from denial of service attacks, as well as limit the exposure of the MANET
to compromised and malicious nodes. We discussed the details of the architec-
ture and protocol used for propagating policy tokens and receivers, and discussed
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the various scenarios of use. For our future work, we plan to study the impact
of our scheme on throughput and latency for different topologies and classes of
traffic. In addition, we intend to quantify the performance of multicast traffic on
mobility scenarios, and to implement and deploy on MANET testbeds with real
traffic.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation through
Grant CNS-07-14277. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, and recommendations
expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the NSF or the US Goverment.
Mansoor Alicherry was supported by Alcatel-Lucent, Murray Hill, New Jer-
sey.
References
1. R. Akbania, T. Korkmaz, and G. Raju. HEAP: A packet authentication scheme for
mobile ad hoc networks. Communications and Networking Simulation Symposium,
2007.
2. T. Anderson, T. Roscoe, and D. Wetherall. Preventing internet denial-of-service
with capabilities. Proc. of Hotnets-II, 2003.
3. M. Blaze, J. Ioannidis, and A. Keromytis. Trust management for ipsec. Symposium
on Network and Distributed Systems Security (SNDSS), 2001.
4. D. Estrin, J. C. Mogul, and G. Tsudik. Visa protocls for controlling interorganiza-
tional datagram flow. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, May
1989.
5. S. Ioannidis, A. D. Keromytis, S. M. Bellovin, and J. M. Smith. Implementing a
distributed firewall. pages 190–199, 2000.
6. J. Jaramillo and R. Srikant. Darwin: Distributed and adaptive reputation mecha-
nism for wireless ad-hoc networks. MOBICOM, 2007.
7. R. Lee. Netware 4.x performance tuning and optimization: Part 3.
http://support.novell.com/techcenter/articles/ana19931001.html, October 1993.
8. B. Parno, D. Wendlandt, E. Shi, A. Perrig, B. Maggs, and Y.-C. Hu. Portcullis:
protecting connection setup from denial-of-capability attacks. SIGCOMM Comput.
Commun. Rev., 37(4):289–300, 2007.
9. E. Shi and A. Perrig. Designing secure sensor networks. IEEE Wireless Commu-
nications, 2004.
10. E. Wobber, M. Abadi, M. Burrows, and B. Lampson. Authentication in the taos
operating system. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, 12, February 1994.
11. B. Wu, J. Chen, J. Wu, and M. Cardei. A survey on attacks and countermeasures
in manets. In Wireless/Mobile Network Security, chapter 12. Springer, 2006.
12. X. Wu and D. K. Y. Yau. Mitigating Denial-of-Service Attacks in MANET by
Distributed Packet Filtering: A Game-theoretic Approach. ASIACCS, March 2007.
13. H. Yang, H. Luo, F. Ye, S. Lu, and L. Zhang. Security in mobile ad hoc networks:
Challenges and solutions. IEEE Wireless Communications, 2004.
10
